TTIP's implications for the global economic integration of Central and Eastern Europe by Novák, Tamás
Chapter 6
TTIP’s Implications for the Global Economic
Integration of Central and Eastern Europe
Tamás Novák
Impact analyses and empirical results of existing studies on the eco-
nomic impacts of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership
(TTIP) show significant benefits for the participating countries.
Eleven out of the 28 members of the European Union (EU) are from
central Europe (“new” member states) and they are mostly small
countries with open economies. The impact on less developed mem-
ber states of the central European region can be even greater. It can
contribute to their deeper integration into the global economic net-
works through investments, but their underdevelopment rightly calls
for caution. The implications and the direction of potential policy
responses are less clear in the rest of eastern Europe. According to
some studies, third countries would be facing losses, and little has
been said about the potential impacts on eastern Europe. Russia, one
of the largest emerging countries, has formulated very ambitious for-
eign economic and policy objectives. It is trying to restore its eco-
nomic and political sphere of influence. Russia and other countries
from the region might forcefully respond to possible trade diversion
effects and worsening competitiveness if the agreement contains sig-
nificant changes. 
Central and eastern Europe (CEE) has started integrating into the
global markets only recently after the breakup of planned economic
systems. This region has been compared to Latin American coun-
tries in the early 1970s in terms of its international economic inte-
gration pattern. Latin America and eastern Europe shared important
macroeconomic characteristics in the final third of the twentieth
century. In this period, both regions displayed similar economic per-
formances, although their economic and political systems were vastly
different. A common feature of the two regions was that they were at
the periphery of the international economy and were facing compa-
rable structural challenges while international economic develop-
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ments exerted identical external pressures on them. Economic
growth slowed, the terms of trade deteriorated, trade balances wors-
ened. This led to dynamically increasing foreign debt, and its servic-
ing consumed large parts of export revenues. Rising indebtedness
did not serve to speed up structural change.1 In both regions the
1990s brought about significant transformation, deep economic
changes, and renewed efforts to achieve quicker economic growth.
On average, Latin America and eastern Europe went through signifi-
cant transformation, Russia and Brazil and other countries have been
considered as rapidly growing large emerging markets. At the same
time, regional integration efforts as well as WTO membership
became important drivers of international economic integration for
several countries in both regions. Despite the remarkable growth
performance in international comparison and the major advances in
catching up with developed countries, their peripheral/semi-periph-
eral position has not changed significantly. In many respects, they
are facing the same challenges of globalization, regional integration,
closing the gap and economic sovereignty.
After the collapse of the planned economic system, most advanced
central European countries managed to adopt the key institutions of a
market economy and liberal democracy. The European Union has
become the most important trading partner for all of them, but policy
orientations, economic growth and democratic transformation showed
big differences across the region. Today, there are two fundamentally
different and distinct country groups in eastern Europe. The first
group consists of countries that have either become members of the
European Union, or were intending to enter the EU and are already
negotiating membership. Some other countries in this group have
association agreements with the EU.2 These countries have chosen the
path of global integration through integration into a large single mar-
ket by giving up several instruments of their external economic policy.
The other group mostly comprises countries that do not possess a
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1Ivan T. Berend, “End of Century. Global Transition to a Market Economy: Laissez-Faire
on the Peripheries?” in Ivan T. Berend, ed., Transition to a Market Economy at the End of the
20th Century (Munich: Südosteuropa-Gesellschaft, 2004). 
2In the region, negotiations are currently underway with Serbia and Montenegro. Candidate
or potential candidate countries are the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Albania,
Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Kosovo. 
realistic perspective of EU membership, or nations that do not intend
to join at all.3
EU member states from central Europe may be viewed as a broadly
coherent group that shares similar interests, although their economic
and political strategies may vary from time to time. Russia, after more
than a decade-long decline, is the largest emerging economic and
political power in eastern Europe today, and has a clear intention to
shape the future of the region. This country is gaining more and more
importance in the Eurasian space and pursues a dissimilar strategy to
what is followed by EU member states. In recent years Russia has ini-
tiated an ambitious integration project with the final objective of cre-
ating a Eurasian Economic Union.4 In addition, it has also sought to
expand its influence westwards by using its natural resources and capi-
tal investments.
Impact of the TTIP and Economic Theories
The advantages of a TTIP agreement are supposed to be similar to
those that were forecast before the creation of the European Single
Market. The internal market in a simple form is based on the neo-
classical approach: eliminating trade and investment barriers equals
increasing trade and investment activity because of bigger expected
returns, efficient labor market, etc. These advantages are supposed to
come from eliminating the distortions of competition. In theory, con-
sumers in each country gain from lower prices and any losses to the
local producers will be more than compensated by the gains from
greater competition. Increased competition and enlarged market
opportunities stimulate the development and use of new technologies
that improve productivity, decrease costs, increase living standards,
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etc. By doing so economic growth rates will be higher and new jobs
will be created.5
This strong belief in market forces and the positive-sum game of
liberalization for each participant seems to be a bit strange at first
sight, so soon after an economic crisis when more cautious strands of
economic thinking are on the rise. The benefits of market forces and
external liberalization have been questioned, weakening the uncondi-
tional mainstream belief in their beneficial effects.6 As far as the bene-
fits of single-market-type integration are concerned, we may argue
from the opposite perspective as well in terms of costs: the single mar-
ket idea involves channeling the negative implications of globalization,
including (1) loss of jobs, because of increased competition; (2) disap-
pearing industries because of weaker, smaller domestic economic
actors; (3) negative impact on structurally weak regions. This last
impact was expected to be eased by regional and structural policies,
though these are seemingly without success as reflected in intensifying
regional differences within the EU.
The objective of the EU Single Market was to deliver higher
growth rates to keep up the pace and successfully compete with fast-
growing emerging regions. Its impacts are not entirely about success
and assessments are only superficially addressing these problems.7
Even if there are arguments to support that the current problems of
the EU have not all been caused by the operation of the Single Mar-
ket, several politicians and the public perceive the Single Market as a
failure.8 During the past two decades, in relative terms, in comparison
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5Stefan Vetter, The Single European Market. 20 Years on Achievements, Unfulfilled Expectations &
Further Potential (Frankfurt am Main: Deutsche Bank AG, DB Research, 2013), p. 4.
6As Joseph Stiglitz writes, “Neo-liberal market fundamentalism was always a political doc-
trine serving certain interests. It was never supported by economic theory. Nor, it should
now be clear, is it supported by historical experience. Learning this lesson may be the silver
lining in the cloud now hanging over the global economy,” accessed at: http://www.project-
syndicate.org/commentary/the-end-of-neo-liberalism-
7Bas Straathof, Gert-Jan Linders, Arjan Lejour and Jan Möhlmann, The Internal Market and
the Dutch Economy: Implications for Trade and Economic Growth (CPB Netherlands Bureau for
Economic Policy Analysis, 2008); Copenhagen Economics, Delivering a Stronger Single Mar-
ket (Nordic Innovation Publication 2012, p. 11); Andrea Boltho and Barry Eichengreen, The
Economic Impact of European Integration, CEPR Discussion Paper 6820, 2008.
8According to Commission calculations, between 1992 and 2008 an additional 2.13% GDP
growth and 2.77 million jobs were created. See European Commission, Communication
with the rest of the world, the EU’s economic performance has deteri-
orated, which may suggest that the primary objective of the Single
Market has not been fulfilled. It is clear that all of the ex-ante assess-
ments were unrealistically optimistic about the positive impacts of the
Single Market9 and were unable to properly address the negative
impacts the less developed members would face.
Impact assessments to date generally show that each country partici-
pating in the TTIP gets benefits; the only question left to answer is the
extent of such benefits, as they may vary from country to country and be
largely a function of the content of the agreement.10 If problem areas
(agriculture, culture, etc.) were taken out of the deal, most of the bene-
fits could not be felt and the advantages would be significantly lower.11
Disregarding the fact that none of the impact assessments is capable of
grasping the implications entirely, and even less able to calculate with
unexpected political and economic changes, not to mention unpre-
dictability of the reactions of third countries, the case of the EU internal
 market— and experiences of other FTAs (Free Trade Agreements)—
prove that less developed countries may lose with liberalization and the
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from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic
and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, Brussels, 3.10.2012. com(2012)
573 final, 2012. It would be interesting to see how many more jobs and how much more
GDP was lost because of the deep integration among the countries. “The Single Market (...)
is less popular than ever, while Europe needs it more than ever.... The Single Market is seen
as ‘yesterday’s business’ compared to other policy priorities.” Mario Monti, A New Strategy
for the Single Market at the Service of Europe’s Economy and Society. Report to the President of
the European Commission, 2010, http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/strategy/docs/
monti_report_final_10_05_2010_en.pdf, p. 6.
9The Cecchini Report calculated a potential wealth effect of 4.25-6.5% of GDP for the
twelve member states in the Single Market. None of the ex-post assessments proves more
than 2 percent, and “… an economic assessment of the Single Market … brings with it the
conceptual difficulty of separating the impact of the Single Market not only from the conse-
quences of globalization, but also from the introduction of the euro.” Vetter, op. cit, p. 3.;
Cecchini, Paolo & Catinat, Michel & Jacquemin, Alexis. 1988. The European Challenge 1992:
The Benefits of a Single Market. Aldershot: Wildwood House Limited.
10Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR), Reducing Transatlantic Barriers to Trade and
Investment. An Economic Assessment. Final Project Report, March 2013; Gabriel Felbermayr,
Benedikt Heid and Sybille Lehwald, Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP).
Who Benefits from a Free Trade Deal? (Gütersloh: Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2013); Gabriel J. Fel-
bermayr and Mario Larch, “The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP):
Potentials, Problems and Perspectives,” CESifo Forum 2/2013 (June).  
11CEPR, op. cit., p. 2.
opening up of markets. The case of Greece and other southern coun-
tries of the EU clearly prove that problems with FTAs and other inte-
gration initiatives can be numerous. Less developed countries of the
European Union, or those that are not competitive enough, would not
gain as much as is forecasted; what is more, the risk of losing is not neg-
ligible, especially if inappropriate economic policies are pursued. The
prospect of gaining less or even sustaining losses by underdeveloped
countries is in line with economic theories that do not believe in posi-
tive sum impacts of international economic liberalization.12
EU Members from Central and Eastern Europe
The potential benefits of small, open economies that deeply inte-
grated into the international division of labor, such as the “new EU
members” that joined the EU in 2004, 2007, and 2013, are believed to
be significant. Some of them have export openness indicators above
the 75-80% range (export/GDP) and their import activities are also
significant because of the high import intensity of their export pro-
duction. This integration into the international division of labor and
openness to trade explains why the calculations on the effects of TTIP
indicate above average benefits for them. Apparently, they are inter-
ested in liberalization and trade facilitation that helps to further
expand their exports. Increasing foreign sales are essentially important
for their sustainable growth. Because of the small domestic market
and the limited local purchasing power, if firms in these countries aim
at increasing sales and creating more jobs, they simply have no alter-
natives to internationalization. Their exports are mostly based on the
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agriculture. In the second stage they must resort to commercial restrictions to promote the
growth of manufactures, fisheries, navigation, and foreign trade. In the last stage, after
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of free trade and of unrestricted competition in the home as well as in foreign markets, so
that their agriculturists, manufacturers, and merchants may be preserved from indolence and
stimulated to retain the supremacy which they have acquired.” Friedrich List, The National
System of Political Economy by Friedrich List.Trans. Sampson S. Lloyd, with an Introduction by
J. Shield Nicholson (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1916) p. xx.
performance of FDI-related manufacturing and services firms, and
they need to elaborate strategies that preserve and strengthen export
orientation. (This should not mean the negligence of domestic
demand  factors— consumption and  investment— but their primary
role is to balance the growth pattern, rather than replace export orien-
tation with domestic demand driven strategy, at least at the current
level of economic development). The success of export-led growth
strategy depends on several factors and there are a number of risks
and challenges of such a strategy as well.13 But countries that imple-
ment strategies that disregard export orientation will soon face sus-
tainability problems.
Because central European countries cannot compete with really
low-wage countries from the Far East (though their wages are still low
in international comparison), long-term sustainable strategies cannot
avoid upgrading technological capabilities by attracting more FDI. If
the conditions of doing business are improved, the rule of law is
upheld, productivity is increased, they could count on increasing
investment from U.S. firms already before the TTIP enters into
force.14 Increased FDI from U.S. production and services firms is the
most important source of possible benefit of the TTIP in the central
European member states. The realistic and sustainable economic
strategy of these countries should focus on the further modernization
of their export structure and the upgrading of technology. This, how-
ever, would require large investments in human and physical infra-
structure and the improvement of the business environment. If these
conditions are fulfilled, theoretically, TTIP would again open a win-
dow of opportunity for several countries to utilize the agreement for
the purpose of accelerating economic growth.
An additional benefit may be related to investments made by third
countries. Participation in integration initiatives influences transaction
costs for third countries that raise the question of production within
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14Daniel Hamilton, “The Changing Nature of the Transatlantic Link: U.S. Approaches and
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the integration area or export there. Integration initiatives (even in
their simplest form, i.e. free trade area) are creating incentives for
third countries to invest within integrated areas in order to avoid
trade-related costs. Theoretically, they can encourage  firms— that may
eventually want to export to the United  States— to invest in central
Europe.15 An investment boom of this kind was evident prior to the
EU accession of the central European countries. The impact of FDI
was largely tangible before the accession took place, not least because
of the extra-EU investments.16 The volume of such investments would
not be too large, but it is potentially to be reckoned with.
On the other hand, however, the risk of smaller than expected
impacts is high, which makes the picture for “new members” and
other peripheral EU countries a little more obscure.17 The problem is
that in several countries the economy has a dual structure; a few large
transnational firms are integrated into the international production
chains, while the rest of the economy is unable to participate in inter-
national trade, because it lacks exportable, competitive products. In
addition, not least because of the internal problems of the European
Union and the increasing Russian influence in the region, the regional
political commitment to liberal economic order and democracy is not
at all guaranteed. And this is an increasingly serious issue in a region
where economic and political transformation was thought to firmly
integrate countries into the system of Western institutions and values.
The changes in political and economic policy strategies may increase
business risks in certain countries. 
Taking all factors taken into consideration, the benefits for the less
developed central European countries in terms of export, FDI and
GDP growth is probably larger than the disadvantages.18 It is explained
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18Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA), “TTIP: What Will It Do for Central
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by their pattern of division of labor that is based on export orientation
of foreign-owned firms. All these favorable impacts, however, can be
utilized only if the business environment is favorable enough. There is,
however a substantial risk that policies in the region may become
inward-looking and more protectionist. This risk is strengthened by
the weak performance of the European economy and the unfulfilled
expectations of the EU membership in terms of catching up.
The choice of economic and political models of Central European
governments may be influenced by the economic performance of
advanced and emerging countries. There is a danger that regional gov-
ernments and politicians see the EU as a weak economic center whose
economic and political model is inadequate to respond to current and
future global challenges. The increasing skepticism may lead to the con-
clusion that, instead of the European model, they should follow poten-
tially more successful strategies. Anti-EU economic and political strate-
gies in the countries shattered by economic difficulties, characterized by
relatively poor economic outlook, and declining standards of living,
however, are on the increase. Developments over the past few years
could easily lead to the introduction of measures that are shockingly dif-
ferent from European traditions and that would probably weaken the
ties that have developed over the past more than two decades. Eco-
nomic integration can be considered “too deep” because the original
objective of economic and political transformation has not been
achieved19 and, instead of convergence on the living standards of more
developed countries, a more complicated balance has been experienced.
The situation could easily worsen. Tempted by the almost unlimited
power of leaders in some post-Soviet countries, democratic systems
could morph into something “new,” into very destructive, obsolete
structures in which country identity is defined in opposition to the
European development model. If that happens, the possible favorable
implications of TTIP will not be felt in the affected countries.
Russia
The original idea that the TTIP agreement can be beneficial for
each country in the long run relies on the presumption that “the eco-
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similar dilemmas are worded in more developed EU members too.
nomic importance of the EU and the United States will mean that
their partners will also have an incentive to move towards the new
transatlantic standards.”20 In other words, third countries would face
such immense losses that it would be their very interest to join the
TTIP. This is an overly optimistic forecast of the prospective develop-
ments. Turning to the third countries in central and eastern Europe,
the key question is Russia, which would definitely take the TTIP for
what it really means for this  country— a geopolitical aspiration that
may threaten Russia’s position in Europe. The important political
objective behind the TTIP is that this large-scale bilateral agreement
increases the incentives of third parties to achieve further liberaliza-
tion steps at the multilat eral level. This way the TTIP (the advanced
countries) becomes a rule setter in international trade for third coun-
tries. It would lead the EU and the United States to regain a leading
position in international trade and economic development. This
expectation is realistic only if third countries feel that it is in their
interest to accept the rules elaborated by developed economies. This
situation would be similar to the decades preceding the economic rise
of large emerging countries, when developing or less developed coun-
tries were not able to defend their interests against the advanced
countries in international economic organizations. This is also the
fundamental issue concerning countries such as China, Russia, India,
and Brazil or other large emerging markets.
None of the scenarios in the existing analyses calculate openly with
potential countermeasures taken by third countries. A more realistic
approach is to examine three scenarios: (1) large emerging countries
may think that they will not lose too much if the agreement finally
remains limited in scope; (2) the TTIP may be a strong incentive for
new agreements and instruments within the framework of WTO
negotiations with the objective of reducing the negative implications;
(3) third countries will increasingly look for countermeasures. The
first two alternatives are clearly far more beneficial for the advanced
world. Regarding the third choice, this would result in the intensifica-
tion of creating trade blocs (that may lead to the increasing disruption
of global trade) and/or instruments which make export and invest-
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Negotiations. European Commission—MEMO/13/564, accessed at: http://europa.eu/rapid/
press-release_MEMO-13-564_en.htm.
ment from advanced countries more difficult. In addition, more con-
certed efforts and countermeasures from large emerging countries
cannot be ruled out if international economic relations are aggravated.
Closer cooperation between large emerging countries regarding inter-
national trade would suffice to establish a common ground for assert-
ing similar interests. Should that come about, it will probably disrupt
global trade and the current institutional system.
Russia has been able to strengthen its position in international rela-
tions and become strong enough to try to regain and increase its influ-
ence in some parts of the CIS (Commonwealth of Independent States).
Russia’s efforts to reintegrate a part of the CIS will continue and
strengthen as a number one priority in its foreign policy. Regarding
economic issues, Russia is becoming an increasingly important player
in the eastern part of Europe and in Asia.21 In recent years, the country
has become one of the most important capital investors in the world,
mostly through state-owned enterprises, though obviously not inde-
pendently from politics, and it has become the number one investor in
the east European region.22 In coming years it is most likely to
strengthen further its efforts to be involved in European business. In
addition to achieving economic penetration, it is also more and more
in Moscow’s interest to stop the spread of Western-style democracy,
perhaps even in countries where it seemed to be solidly rooted.23
In addition to geopolitical considerations, the most important issue
for Russia relates to the energy sector. If TTIP eases access to U.S.
gas, it will benefit both European consumers and the industry. (On the
other hand, cheap gas exports to Europe would erode the competitive
advantage of U.S. firms over European competitors.) At the same
time, this new source of natural gas would substantially diminish
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Europe’s dependence on Russian gas, which is disadvantageous to
Russia from macroeconomic and geopolitical perspectives. As Euro-
pean demand decreases, Russia will be increasingly forced to reorient
its energy exports to other markets, and gain influence mostly through
investments in the European energy and financial sectors. There are
clear signs that Russia seeks exert influence over as many European
assets as possible. The biggest opportunity for Russia to do that is in
the central European region with which it can partly substitute its
losses in natural gas exports provided that U.S. gas is imported more
easily. In addition, Russia can restrict its imports from Europe in
response, since Moscow uses trade policy as a political tool, despite its
recent WTO membership. If Russia considers that its loss is too big in
Europe and it is not possible to regain a share of it in other parts of
the globe, then it can use its imports from Europe as a bargaining
power.
To sum up, energy is a sensitive issue for the Russian economy and
the danger of worsening Russian positions in the European market
may cause Russia to control as many countries as it is possible through
oil, gas, nuclear power generation or financial sector investments. The
TTIP could be an important element in the changes of the global
energy landscape. After the conclusion of the TTIP, sooner or later
U.S. natural gas exports will definitely and significantly increase. It
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Table 1. Geographical Pattern of Russian Merchandise Trade
(% of total export or import)
Export                            2005            2012                   Import                        2005            2012
Total                            100.00         100.00                   Total                         100.00         100.00
EU                                 53.63           48.96                   EU                             42.79           40.34
Germany                         8.17             6.79                   Germany                    13.45           12.11
Netherlands                  10.19           14.63                   Italy                             4.47             4.24
Italy                                7.89             6.18                   France                          3.72             4.36
CEE6*                           10.59             8.41                   CEE6*                          5.91             6.98
CIS                               13.51           14.94                   CIS                            19.24           13.77
China                              5.40             6.81                   China                           7.36           16.39
USA                                2.62             2.47                   USA                             4.62             4.85
Rest of the World         24.84           26.82                   Rest of the World      25.99           24.65
Source: Own calculation, Central Bank of Russia.
*Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, Romania.
could have serious geopolitical implications for Europe’s own relation-
ship with Russia.
Conclusion
The impact of the TTIP on central and eastern Europe depends on
the details of the final agreement. There are three scenarios; each has
very different implications both for members and third countries. 
(1) Since the aim of the TTIP is political, the discussion will con-
centrate on regulations and standards (trade, consumer safety, envi-
ronment, etc.), but because of the conflicts between the EU and the
United States concerning the underlying principles, without achieving
sizeable results. 
(2) The TTIP breaks away from prevailing international trade pat-
terns because it leads to new standards that are protectionist against
third countries such as China, India, Russia, etc. Global trade becomes
fragmented with intensifying role of regional blocs. 
(3) The third alternative is an open TTIP that encourages third
countries to join. As a result, the TTIP would become the core of a
new global trading system where the rule setters are once again the
most advanced economies.
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Table 2. Russia’s Trade with the EU by SITC section 2012 
(% of total export or import)
                                                                                                       Export                   Import
0          Food and live animals                                                             0.6                        6.7
1          Beverages and tobacco                                                          0.0                        1.3
2          Crude materials, inedible, except fuels                                   0.9                        1.4
3          Mineral fuels, lubricants and related materials                     76.3                        1.1
4          Animal and vegetable oils, fats and waxes                             0.2                        0.4
5          Chemicals and related products, n.e.c                                    3.0                      15.8
6          Manufactured goods classified chiefly by material                 6.4                      10.3
7          Machinery and transport equipment                                      0.9                      49.6
8          Miscellaneous manufactured articles                                     0.2                      11.9
9          Commodities and transactions n.e.c                                      2.8                        0.8
Source: European Commission, Directorate-General for Trade.
It is impossible to see today which of these alternatives will become
a reality. If TTIP develops into a deep, comprehensive agreement, its
impact will be far greater. In this case central European member
countries of the EU would theoretically gain a lot due to their inte-
gration into the division of labor, mostly through transnational firms
at different levels of their supplier chain. If the governments of these
countries pursue outward-looking economic policies and improve
their business environment, this would attract additional foreign
direct investments, mostly from U.S. firms, but an increase in invest-
ment from third countries can also not be ruled out entirely. However,
the risk of inward-looking policies in this region is intensifying, which
would render the utilization of opportunities even more difficult.
Regarding third countries from the region, the strategy Russia
chooses to adopt seems to be the most important. The negative impli-
cations of a deep TTIP would be intense. The first impact would be
related to trade diversion in the short run. The long term implication
is, however, much more serious and relates to Russian energy exports
that make up around 75% of Russian sales to the EU. As the TTIP
would improve the market access of U.S. energy to Europe, Russian
energy exports would be seriously hit. To counterbalance these nega-
tive implications, in addition to export reorientation towards other
countries, Moscow may seek to increase its influence in other sectors
through investments into European assets. In an extreme case, the
TTIP may trigger stronger cooperation among large emerging coun-
tries to formulate concerted efforts to neutralize negative conse-
quences of the agreement.
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